INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
10 May 2012
Civil procedure. Access to evidence. Taking of evidence.
In a labour law case, which was to heard by the Supreme Court, a claim for witness testimonies was not allowed, cf. section 21-12 subsection 2 1st sentence of the Disputes Act . The request for the taking of evidence was allowed, cf. section 27-1 subsection 1 cf. section 21-11 subsection 1.b of the Disputes Act. The request for access to evidence was not allowed since the request was worded as a claim for the appellants to document the respondents’ legal submission, and not as a claim for access to any real evidence, cf. section 26-6 subsection 1 of the Disputes Act.
Reference: HR-2012-1004-F, case no. 2011/2085, civil appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
10 May 2012
Criminal law. Securities trading. Inside information. Confidentiality
The defendant had as portfolio administrator received information about an offer to acquire a major shareholding in a limited company which made him suspect that the market had different access to information. He passed on the information to the management of the limited company. The Supreme Court construed section 3-4 subsection 1 of the Securities Trading Act, cf. Council Directive 2003/6/EF, to mean that it would normally constitute a breach of confidentiality if a company is given information about attempts at concealed acquisition of the company’s shares. The defendant’s sole purpose of contacting the company was, however, to prevent inside trading and price manipulation with the risk of losing other shareholders. The management of the limited company was in this situation not to be regarded as “unauthorised” under section 3-4 subsection 1 of the Securities Trading Act. Reference was made to the fact that the purpose of the law and the Directive was to ensure a well- functioning share where the players can rely on buying selling on equal conditions. Deviating rationale from one judge. The prosecuting authority’s appeal against the Court of Appeal’ acquittal was rejected.
Reference: HR-2012-1012-A, case no. 2011/2142), criminal appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
10 May 2012
Corporate penalty. Compensation for non-economic loss. Requirements as to safe working environment.
On the job, an operator fell 9 metres from an unsecured platform. As a result of his injuries he became 100% disabled. Objectively speaking, the Working Environment Act had been breached. In contrast to the lower courts, the Supreme Court held that a corporate penalty should be imposed under section 48b of the Penal Code. The company’s HMS system was not in itself defective, but the company’s control system should have caught the elements of risk of the platform which, due to the design, invited the use of the unsecured part. The corporate penalty was set at NOK 500 000. The shift foremen could not be deemed to have been grossly negligent even if they were aware of the elements of danger but had not reported this as deviations to the management. There was no basis for compensation for non-economic loss under section 3-5 of the Compensatory Damages Act.
Reference: HR-2012-1016-A, case no. 2011/2102), criminal appeal against judgment.
Interlocutory Order
10 May 2012
The appeal proceedings in the Appeals Committee in case no. 2012/809 are stayed until a final decision has been made in case no. 2012/398.
Reference: HR-2012-1013-F, case no. 2012/809), civil appeal against judgment.
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
8 May 2012
Section 18-4 of the Disputes Act (2005)
The case concerns voluntary waiver of legal action under section 18-4 subsection 4 of the Disputes Act.
Reference: HR-2012-978-F, case no.2012/613, civil appeal against interlocutory order.
JUDGMENT
8 May 2012
Criminal procedure. Court of Appeal judges’ competence.
After the court had set aside a jury’s verdict of acquittal, the case was submitted for a new trial with other Court of Appeal judges from the same Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court cited that the law provides that in the new trial the court shall be composed of judges from the same Court of Appeal as the one that set aside the jury’s verdict, cf. section 376 a of the Criminal Procedure Act. This system is based on the assumption that it is not contrary to section 108 of the Courts of Justice Act and must be seen in conjunction with section 38 of the Courts of Justice Act, which allows the transfer of the case to a court at the same level “if special reasons make it necessary or expedient”. The system was not in violation of Article 6.1 of the ECHR if there were no allegations of any special circumstances associated with the individual judge.
Reference: HR-2012-974-A, case no. 2011/2126), criminal appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
8 May 2012
Tax Law. Tax allowance for gifts to charitable organisations.
The case concerned the validity of a decision by the assessment authorities. The question is whether costs of meeting profiling agreements with non-profit organisations are incurred for the purpose of securing taxable income under section 6-1 of the Act relating to Payment and Collection of Taxes and are accordingly tax deductible. The Supreme Court unanimously held that the association requirement under section 6-1 was not satisfied because the purpose of the project contribution had been to transfer funds to the organisations without receiving any agreed consideration; in other words, a gift disposition. The appeal was rejected.
Reference: HR-2012-976A, case no. 2011/1774, civil appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
8 May 2012
Criminal law. Motorised traffic on outfield land. Helicopter.
The case concerned the understanding of section 2 of the Motorised Traffic Act. A hunting party had felled a stag and called in a helicopter to transport the dead stag out of the hunting ground. The helicopter never touched down, but was held at an altitude of 15 metres for 5-10 minutes while the stag was attached to a line. The question was whether this situation came under the ban against “landing” on outfield land. The Supreme Court held that section 2 of the Motorised Traffic Act cannot be construed to prohibit the activities at issue. The text of the law, read in conjunction with the preparatory works, suggests that the term “landing” also comprises situations where – without landing the helicopter – it is possible to carry out directly from the ground the same loading and unloading operations as by a landing on the ground. But there is no basis for taking this any further and the accused were acquitted.
Reference: HR-2012-977-A, case no. 2012/117, criminal appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
8 May 2012
Contract law. Refund of revised tax on treated waste. Limitation.
On 12 June 2008, the Southern Norway customs region made a decision for a revision of tax on treated waste for the period 1 October 2002 – 31 October 2005 determined pursuant to the Act relating to Sales Tax of 19 May 1933 no. 11, cf. the Sales Tax Regulation of 11 December 2001 no. 1451. The tax claim was paid under protest. As regards tax that fell due for payment before the Act relating to Payment and Collection of Taxes came into force on 1 January 2008, the Supreme Court held that the limitation period for each individual instalment had started running from the reporting and limitation date for the instalment in question. The supplementary period of limitation under section 10.1 of the Statute of Limitations was not applicable. As regards tax that had not become statute-barred when the Act relating to Payment and Collection of Taxes came into force, it followed from section 10-53, cf. section 12-1 subsection 2, of the Act that the limitation period did not commence to run until the end of the calendar year when the term of payment of three weeks after the decision of a revision expired, i.e. 31 December 2008. The State was ordered to refund the part of the claim subject to taxation that was statute-barred when it was paid. Dissenting votes 4-1.
Reference: HR-2012-981-A, case no. 2011/1933, civil appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
2 May 2012
Criminal law. Sentencing. Rape. Minor.
A man was convicted of rape with a bottle of a minor girl who, due to intoxication, was incapable of resisting the act, cf. section 192 subsection 1 b, cf. subsection 2 a, cf. subsection 3 a of the Penal Code. The Court of Appeal had set the basis for sentencing at 5 years. The Supreme Court found this to be too strict and set the basis for sentencing at a term of imprisonment of between 4 years and 4 years and 6 months. The defendant was granted a reduction of his sentence for a full confession, and the fact that the defendant was immature and that the offence seemed to be in the nature of an act of impulse carried a certain weight. The Supreme Court majority did not find that the defendant’s life situation gave grounds for deviating from the principle that the sentence shall be custodial. The sentence was set at a term of imprisonment of 2 years and 10 months. Dissenting votes 4-1.
Reference: HR-2012-914-A, case no. 2011/2125, criminal appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
2 May 2012
Criminal law. Market manipulation.
Two « day traders » had, independently of each other, found a pattern as to how bid and ask prices were changed regardless of the volume traded. This was exploited to carry out a series of transactions that were later reversed. For the most part, the reversal generated a profit. The Supreme Court majority held that the defendants’ conduct fell under the wording of section
3-8 subsection 2.1 first alternative of the Securities Trading Act, cf. Regulation to section 3-2 subsection 1 of the Securities Trading Act, and under the wording of section
3-8 subsection 2.1 second alternative of the Securities Trading Act. The majority nevertheless concluded that the consequence of the general reservation of unlawfulness was that the defendants must be acquitted. Importance was attached to the fact that the procedure seemed to be generally accepted in the market and that the defendants did not in effect manipulate, but reacted to an inefficiency in the market. They had acted in total openness and not given any incorrect information. The appeal was rejected. (Dissenting votes 3-2).
Reference: HR-2012-919-A, case no. 2011/1916, criminal appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
2 May 2012
Immigration law. Administrative law. Refuge on humanitarian grounds. Subsequent circumstances.
The case concerned the issue whether the courts in their reviewing of a decision refusing an application for Refuge in Norway on humanitarian grounds under section 38 of the Immigration Act have the right to rely on facts that have come to light after the decision was made. Concretely, the appeal concerned the fact that the son in the family obtained Norwegian citizenship and lost his citizenship in Sri Lanka after UNE (the Norwegian Immigration Appeals Board) refused the applications for refuge from the rest of the family. The Supreme Court majority held that the court had the right to take subsequent circumstances into account and that the Court of Appeal’s judgment must be set aside. The rationale given by two of the judges was Norway’s human rights obligations, cf. Article 8 of the ECHR and Articles 3, 8 and 9 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Two of the judges’ rationale for the result was that a court’s review of an administrative decision, unless there is a special statutory authority to the contrary, must be based on the facts to hand at the time when the matter is set down for judgment. (Dissenting votes).
Reference: HR-2012-920-A, case no. 2012/38, civil appeal against judgment.
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
2 May 2012
Immigration law. Administrative law. Reversal.
The issue of the case was whether, after a final and enforceable judgment in favour of the State in a case relating to the validity of a decision made by the Norwegian Immigration Appeals Board has been made, it is possible to bring a new action claiming that a decision which refuses or declines to consider a reversal is invalid. The Supreme Court held that a refusal of a petition for a reversal of an administrative decision can, by its nature, be submitted to the courts, cf. section 1-3 of the Disputes Act. The matter could not be dismissed from the courts on the grounds that the claim had already been decided and the decision was final and enforceable, because the subject matters of the two cases were different. The appeal was rejected.
Reference: HR-2012-921-A, case no.2011/2038), civil appeal against Interlocutory Order.
JUDGMENT
2 May 2012
Criminal law. Sentencing. Mobile crime committed for personal gain.
Two Lithuanian men sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for various forms of crime committed for personal gain, cf. sections 257 and 258 of the Penal Code. Together with three other Lithuanian citizens they were convicted of having during the period from March 2009 to May 2011 committed seven aggravated thefts, three attempted aggravated thefts, one handling offence and one theft. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal’s sentence of two years for one of the defendants and rejected his appeal. As regards the other defendant, the Supreme Court found that the sentence was too severe in that the sentence must reflect the limited actions which he was convicted of. The sentence was set at a term of imprisonment of one year and six months.
Reference: HR-2012-924-A, case no.2012/179), criminal appeal against judgment.
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
25 April 2012
Section 19-2 of the Disputes Act
The appeal is quashed
Reference: HR-2012-849-F, case no. 2012/781), civil appeal against an interlocutory order.
JUDGMENT
23 April 2012
Criminal procedure. Composition of the court.
An extraordinary judge in the Court of Appeal had not been appointed ad interim during the appeal proceedings and the handing down of the sentence. This meant that the constitution of the court was not lawful. This was a procedural error, which shall unconditionally carry weight, cf. section 343, subsection 2.3, of the Criminal Procedure Act. The Court of Appeal's judgment with trial was set aside.
HR-2012-805-A, case no. 2012/204), criminal appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
23 April 2012
Criminal law. Grossly negligent serious fraud. The Storting’s pension scheme.
A former member of the Storting had received pension benefits to which he was not entitled according to the Pension Act for members of the Storting of 12 June 1981 No. 61 in force at the time, in that he had income which in total exceeded the income limitations in section 2 subsection 4 of the Act. In the Court of Appeal he was acquitted of the charges under section 271a cf. section 271 cf. section 270 of the Penal Code (grossly negligent serious fraud). The Supreme Court held that the Defendant had not caused, strengthened or exploited any ignorance on the part of the secretary of the pension scheme and that it was furthermore not contrary to honesty and good faith for him to have relied on the incorrect information which the secretary had given him as to what income was not to be taken into account. He had accordingly not unlawfully misled the pension scheme. The defendant’s mistake in law was to be adjudged under section 42 of the Penal Code, and not section 57. The prosecuting authority’s appeal was quashed
Reference: HR-2012-810-A, case no. 2011/2103), criminal appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
23 April 2012
Criminal law. Application of the law. Inside trading.
The case concerned criminal inside trading and raised the question of the understanding of the term « inside information » in section 2-2 of the Securities Trading Act of 1997 (now section 3-2 of the Securities Trading Act of 2007). The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that the definition in section 2.2 subsection 3 - the so-called "sensible-investor test" - was exhaustive and that no quantifiable price-impact effect could be required in addition. This interpretation was not contrary to the EU market abuse directive, Article 1 No. 1. The appeals against the Court of Appeal's judgment were rejected
Reference: HR-2012-812-A, case no. 2011/2045), criminal appeal against judgment.
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
19 April 2012
Bankruptcy. Bankruptcy sequestration. Lawyers' professional secrecy.
The administrator of a lawyer's bankruptcy estate requested the release of the lawyer's accounts and accountancy material from the time prior to the bankruptcy. The Court of Appeal had upheld the request. The Supreme Court stated that also in a bankruptcy situation information about money transfers between lawyer and client and names of clients must be subject to professional secrecy, unless otherwise provided by a special authority in law. As a result of the reference in section 149 subsection 1 of the Bankruptcy Act, the prohibition against evidence set out in section 22-5 of the Disputes Act must also apply similarly to bankruptcy proceedings. The rules related to sequestration and duty of disclosure set out in the Bankruptcy Act cannot lead to any other result. The Court of Appeal's interlocutory order was quashed.
Reference: HR-2012-788-A, case no. 2011/1731), civil appeal against interlocutory order.
JUDGMENT
17 April 2012
Value Added Tax.
A company bought a vessel for passenger transport in 1999. According to the rules contained in section 16 no. 5 of the Value Added Tax Act of 1969, incoming VAT was not deductible at that time. In 2008, the company sold the vessel and was ordered to pay VAT on the sale according to the Value Added Tax Act 1969, section 13, in that the rules on exemption from VAT related to passenger transport had been amended in the meantime. The Supreme Court majority held that the rules in force at the time of the sale were applicable. As the source-of-law picture was unclear, real considerations were decisive for the interpretation. The importance of the necessity for the rules to be easy to implement and not give rise to verification problems was pointed out. The majority agreed with the State and quashed the company’s appeal. Dissenting votes 3-2.
Reference: HR-2012-769-A, case no. 2011/1668), civil appeal against judgment.
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
16 April 2012
Disputes Act (2005) section 19-2
The appeal is quashed.
Reference: HR-2012-753-F, case no. 2012/523), civil appeal against interlocutory order.
Interlocutory Order
16 April 2012
Disputes Act (2005) section 19-2
The appeal is quashed.
Reference: HR-2012-753-F, case no. 2012/523), civil appeal against Interlocutory Order.
Judgment
13 April 2012
Criminal law. Sentencing. Assault causing bodily harm.
The defendant was in the District Court sentenced to 1 year and 6 months’ imprisonment for assault causing serious bodily harm, cf. section 229 1st penal alternative, cf. section 232, of the Penal Code. The man had arranged a meeting with the victim in order to frighten him. One of the other defendants brought a knife for the confrontation and the victim suffered several serious knife stabs. The Supreme Court stated that the sentence needed to reflect the defendant’s dominating role as an initiator of the violent attack on the victim. The Supreme Court still held that the Court of Appeal had not to a sufficient degree taken into consideration the fact that the defendant was not aware of a knife having been brought along to the confrontation. Even though the offence was very serious, this set clear limits as to the length of the prison sentence that could be meted out. The sentence was changed to 10 months’ imprisonment.
Reference: HR-2012-742-A, case no. 2011/2110), criminal appeal against judgment.
Reappraisal
13 April 2012
Reappraisal. Expropriation. Compensation. Grounds for reappraisal.
Section 5 of the Expropriations Act.
The case concerned the question whether a reappraisal related to expropriation of land to the tramway system in Bergen had to be set aside on the grounds of defective reasons or misapplication of the law. The Supreme Court held that the parts of the reappraisal that concerned the determination of compensation for the surrender of land and the litigation costs before the Court of Appeal must be set aside.
Reference: HR-2012-743-A, case no. 2011/1697, civil appeal against reappraisal.
Interlocutory Order
13 April 2012
Disputes Act (2005) section 19-2
Appeal proceedings in the Appeals Selection Committee in case no. 2012/347 are stayed until a final decision is made in case no. 2012/398.
Reference: HR-2012-748-F, case no. 2012/347, civil appeal against decision.
Interlocutory Order
13 April 2012
Disputes Act (2005) section 19-2
Appeal proceedings in the Appeals Selection Committee in case no. 2012/347 are stayed until a final decision is made in case no. 2012/398.
Reference: HR-2012-748-F, case no. 2012/348, civil appeal against decision.
Interlocutory Order
13 April 2012
Disputes Act (2005) section 19-2
Appeal proceedings in the Appeals Selection Committee in case no. 2012/347 are stayed until a final decision is made in case no. 2012/398.
Reference: HR-2012-748-F, case no. 2012/349, civil appeal against decision.
Interlocutory Order
16 April 2012
Disputes Act (2005) section 19-2
The appeal is quashed.
Reference: HR-2012-753-F, case no. 2012/523), civil appeal against Interlocutory Order.
Interlocutory Order
10 April 2012
Disputes Act (2005) section 19-2
The Supreme Court quashed the appeal.
Reference: HR-2012-719-F, case no. 2011/1871, civil appeal against an interlocutory order.
JUDGMENT
30 March 2012
Administrative law. Law of damages. Partnership and company law. Limitation. Detailed regulation of fisheries
A fishing limited company was, after an appeal to the Ministry of Fisheries relating to a negative decision by the Fisheries Directorate, granted the right to participation in fisheries subject to detailed regulation. The company and the principal shareholder presented a claim against the state for damages for operating loss in the period when the Directorate’s decision was in effect. For the principal shareholder the Supreme Court stated unanimously that given that the application was filed by the company, this also had to be taken for a basis for the rights and obligations which the permission provided. Nor did section 17-6 of the Companies Act provide any right for the principal shareholder to file a direct claim against the alleged tortfeasor. As regards the company, a writ was issued 49 days after expiry of the 3-year time-limit set out in section 9.1 of the Statute of Limitations. This period was on somewhat varying grounds accepted as a necessary period for consideration after the Directorate’s decision. The claim was not statute-barred at that time. The principal shareholder’s appeal was quashed. As regards the company, the Court of Appeal’s judgment was set aside.
Reference: HR-2012-687-A, case no. 2011/1675), civil appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
30 March 2012
Criminal law. Freedom of speech. Racial remarks.
The Defendant had in an intoxicated state made insulting accusations against a doorman at a club. The purpose was to humiliate the victim and to dispute his suitability as a doorman based on the colour of his skin. The remarks were deemed to represent a serious disparagement of the human worth of a group of people and were not protected by section 100 of the Constitution. The defendant’s appeal against the conviction under section135a of the Penal Code was unanimously quashed.
Reference: HR-2012-689-A, case no. 2012/143, criminal appeal against judgment.
Interlocutory Order
30 March 2012
Criminal Procedure Act (1981) section 434
The Supreme Court quashed the appeals as regards the civil claims.
Reference: HR-2012-707-F, case no. 2011/1445, criminal appeal against judgment
JUDGMENT
29 March 2012
Law of property. Limitation. Recovery of real estate.
The case concerned the question of whether a claim for the recovery of real estate based on the transfer of the property being invalid is subject to limitation. The Supreme Court referred to the travaux préparatoires to section 1 of the Limitation Act and the legal tradition on which this is founded and held that the transferor's claim for restitution against the party who has acquired the object by an agreement which is not binding on the transferor is not statute-barred. This was a reflection of a firmly established legal tradition, it appeared to be deemed implicit by the legislator and had enjoyed general support in legal theory over a long period of time. There were also good and real grounds to suggest that the respondents' claim for a restitution of the property must be regarded as a claim for recovery of property wrongfully received, which does not become statute-barred.
Reference: HR-2012-672-A, case no. 2011/1477, civil appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
29 March 2012
Immigration law. Asylum. Homosexuality.
The case concerned the validity of a decision by the Immigration Appeals Board and raised the question as to whether an Iraqi citizen is entitled to asylum on the grounds that he as a homosexual has a well-founded fear of persecution in Irak. The Court of Appeal found that it was not known in Irak that the asylum seeker was homosexual. The court further assumed that upon his return he would adapt his life so as to avoid persecution. In this light the Court of Appeal held that neither the conditions for asylum contained in section 17 of the Immigration Act of 1988, nor the conditions for protection against return in section 15 were satisfied. The Supreme Court quashed the Court of Appeal's judgment with appeal proceedings because the Court of Appeal had not made a decision as to what the reason was for the asylum seeker wanting to keep his sexual inclination a secret. If there were real grounds for fearing persecution and the fear of persecution was crucial to his choice, the condition that there must be a "well-founded fear of being persecuted", cf. Article 1 A of the Refugee Convention, cf. Protocol 31 January 1967, would be satisfied.
Reference: HR-2012-667-A, case no. 2011/1688), civil appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
29 March 2012
The courts' competence to review decisions made by the Norwegian Criminal Cases Review Commission.
The case concerned the courts' competence to review a decision made by the Norwegian Criminal Cases Review Commission (the Review Commission) not to reopen a criminal case. The Supreme Court held that a convicted person, whose petition for a reopening of a case has been rejected, may bring a validity action before the courts, but there are limits to the courts' judicial review competence. The Commission's assessment of evidence cannot be reviewed. Reference was made to the fact that the considerations that formed the basis of the establishment of a separate commission were particularly relevant for the assessment of evidence and that it would be contrary to the thinking behind the establishment of the Commission if the courts could be made an arena for a replay regarding the evidence. Nor could the concrete application of the law be reviewed. The limits to the right of review were neither in violation of section 88 of the Constitution nor other constitutional rules or principles. Nor did they represent any breach of Article 6 no. 1 of the ECHR. The appeal was quashed.
Reference: HR-2012-669-S, case no. 2011/1820), civil appeal against judgment.
Interlocutory Order
22 March 2012
Section 19-2 of the Disputes Act (2005)
The Supreme Court quashed the appeal
Reference: HR-2012-610-F, case no.2012/503, civil appeal against judgment.
Interlocutory Order
22 March 2012
Section 19-2 of the Disputes Act (2005)
The Supreme Court quashed the appeal
Reference: HR-2012-614-F, case no.2012/220, civil appeal against interlocutory order.
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
22 March 2012
Bankruptcy. Avoidance
A parent company, which had a considerable debt to a subsidiary, paid a claim for the subsidiary and set off the payment against the debt. The subsidiary's bankruptcy estate claimed an avoidance of the payment under section 5-5 of the Creditors Recovery Act. As for the question whether a payment from a third party was voidable in relation to the recipient, the Supreme Court held that in a case as the one at hand, where the same person was in control of the liquidity in both companies and where the immediate purpose of the payment was to cover the subsidiary's debt, it must be decisive that in reality a payment had been made from the debtor itself. The Supreme Court further held, in contrast to the Court of Appeal, that the crucial point must be that the subsidiary's claim against the parent company had in actual fact represented a means of payment for the subsidiary and consequently had to be taken into account in the evaluation of the question whether the payment had significantly impaired the subsidiary's ability to pay. The Court of Appeal's interlocutory order was quashed.
Reference: HR-2012-617-A, case no. 2011/1555), civil appeal against an interlocutory order. .
JUDGMENT
15 March 2012
Tax law. Value added tax. The Value Added Tax Act 1969 section 21 subsection 1 1st sentence.
The case concerned the validity of a decision of the Board of Appeal for Value Added Tax relating to reconciliation of VAT. A commercial company liable to pay VAT acquired a plot of land for a commercial building for its business operation. By way of consideration the company erected a semi-detached house on another plot of land which it owned and transferred this property to the seller of the plot. The company subsequently claimed deduction for incoming VAT on the costs related to the erection of the semi-detached house. The Supreme Court majority held that the exchange of properties must be regarded as part of the business activities, that the erection costs were relevant for the business activities and that they must be deemed to have a sufficiently close and natural connection to those activities. The erection of the semi-detached house was thus comprised by the concept of business activities in section 21 subsection 1 1st sentence of the Value Added Tax Act so that incoming VAT related to the erection was deductible. The Board of Appeal's decision was quashed. The judgment was passed with dissenting votes 3-2
Reference: HR-2012-578-A, case no. 2011/1595), civil appeal against judgment. .
JUDGMENT
15 March 2012
Labour law. Age discrimination. Person seeking work. Damages for non-economic loss.
A 61-year old male trained social worker alleged that he was the subject of age discrimination when he was not called in for an interview in connection with the filling of a public position and claimed damages for non-economic loss under section 13-9 of the Working Environment Act. The Supreme Court, which relied on the reversed burden of proof rule in section 13-8 of the Working Environment Act, held that the reason why the applicant was not called in for an interview was in all probability that the employer wanted to recruit people with other skills than social education. This was accordingly not a question of discrimination in violation of section 13-1 subsection 1 of the Working Environment Act. The appeal against the Court of Appeal's judgment in favour of the Defendant was quashed.
Reference: HR-2012-580-A, case no. 2011/1714), civil appeal against judgment.
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
15 March 2012
Section 19-2 of the Disputes Act (2005)
The Supreme Court rejected the appeal.
Reference: HR-2012-596-F, case no. 2011/2033), civil appeal against judgment.
DECISION
7 March 2012
Appointment of experts.
Request for appointment of experts before the Supreme Court in appeals case 2011/1916 - application of the law in connection with the question of guilt in a case related to market manipulation - was allowed with the same mandate as the experts had had before the Court of Appeal.
Reference: HR-2012-518-F, case no. 2011/1916), criminal appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
6 March 2012
Family law. Pre-nuptial agreement. Separate property. Section 42 of the Marriage Act.
The case concerned the validity of a pre-nuptial agreement and the question whether the pre-nuptial agreement suffered from such defects as to make it invalid, or if subsequent circumstances entailed that it had lapsed.
Reference: HR-2012-499-A, case no. 2011/1516), civil appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
5 March 2012
Criminal law. Sexual abuse of stepdaughter. Application of the law.
A man was convicted of having sexually abused his stepdaughter, who was 18 1/2 at the time of the abuse. The question was whether section 199 subsection 1 of the Penal Code applies to sexual abuse of stepchildren who are over 18 years of age after the words "any person under the age of 18" was included in the section by an amendment of the law in 1992, and the words
"any other person" by a new amendment in 2000. The Supreme Court majority attached importance to the history and the travaux preparatoires to the Act and held that the 18-year limit only relates to "any other person" and does not apply to foster children or stepchildren. The victim was under the care of her stepfather in the sense of the law. The conviction did not represent any infringement of Article 7 of the ECHR or section 96 of the Constitution.
Dissenting votes: 3-2
Reference: HR-2012-489-A, case no. 2011/2031), criminal appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
5 March 2012
Contract law. Mitigation clause. Incentive agreement.
The case concerned the issue whether an incentive agreement, which itself contained a mitigation clause, should be set aside based on section 36 of the Contracts Act.
Reference: HR-2012-490-A, case no. 2011/1274, civil appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
28 February 2012
Contract law. Contractual relationship. Loan-financed savings product.
The case concerned the validity of loan-financed purchase of composite investment products. The question was whether two private individuals' loan-financed investment in Storebrand Bank ASA's « Index bond Allocation II 2006-2010 » should be set aside, wholly or in part, under section 36 of the Contracts Act. The appeal was quashed. Dissenting vote 4-1.
Reference: case no. 2011/1053 civil appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
28 February 2012
Law of damages. Estate agent's liability
The case concerned a claim for damages against an estate agent on the grounds of extinguishing a hedge bond and on the grounds of failure to carry out an estate agent's assignment, cf. sections 6-3 and 6-9 of the Estate Agency Act. The Supreme Court found that the estate agency had acted contrary to the terms of the contract and negligently when extinguishing the hedge bond. It further entailed liability that nothing had been done to eliminate the risk of loss which the extinguishing of the bond entailed or to notify the buyers. The loss for which compensation could be claimed as a result of this must be limited to the value of a remaining and unsold section, which constituted one sixth of the purchase price. The majority concluded that the estate agent must also be held liable for the remainder of the purchase price. There was nothing to indicate that the assignment had been transferred to the buyer's lawyer and the estate agent had an independent responsibility to follow up the issuing of the deed. However, the compensation referring to the failure to register the deed was reduced by one third, cf. section 5-1 of the Compensatory Damages Act since the delayed transfer of title was caused by the purchaser's desire to transfer the title direct to the buyer of the housing unit. (Dissenting vote 4-1).
Reference: HR-12-447-A, case no. 2011/1632, civil appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
27 February 2012
Criminal law. Sentencing. Narcotics. Import. Cooperation with the police.
In a case concerning sentencing for the import of around 940 grams of cocaine and 900 grams of heroin, cf. section 162 subsection 1, cf. subsection 3 1st sentence, of the Penal Code, the issue was the importance of the fact that the defendant had cooperated with the police with a view to clearing up the case. The basis for the sentencing would in principle be around seven years. A discount of one year and three months was given for a full confession, cf. section 59 subsection 2 of the Penal Code. As regards what discount should be given for the cooperation with the police, this would depend on a combined evaluation where essential elements were the extent of the cooperation, the importance of the assistance the accused had given and the risk to which she had exposed herself as a result of her assistance. In this case the assistance was fairly comprehensive and not without risk, and the Supreme Court held that a discount of around 20 per cent should be given. After a few personal extenuating circumstances had also been taken into account, the sentence was set at four years' imprisonment.
Reference: HR-2012-430-A, case no. 2011/2145, criminal appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
23 February 2012
Contract law. Rent. Arbitration.
In a dispute relating to adjustment of rent for business premises the parties had, instead of going to arbitration as provided by the lease, agreed to request the District Court to appoint a valuation board, cf. section 12-2 of the Rent Act. The issue in the case was whether the parties had thereby waived the arbitration clause in the lease, or whether the valuation board’s determination of rent must be regarded as a form of arbitration process. The Supreme Court majority held that the parties’ correspondence in connection with the appointment of the valuation board did not provide grounds for alleging that the parties had waived the right to a trial by the courts. The Supreme Court held that case was to be submitted to the District Court. (Dissenting vote).
Reference: HR-2012-400-A, case no. 2011/1743, civil appeal against interlocutory order.
JUDGMENT
23 February 2012
Family law. Visitation rights.
The case concerned legal boundaries for determination of visitation rights for others than parents. The Supreme Court held unanimously that section 43 subsection 3 of the Children Act must be interpreted to mean that it authorizes conditions associated with the implementation of the parents’ visitation rights under section 43 subsection 1. It could therefore not be interpreted to mean that there was a basis for granting the aunt such rights as the Court of Appeal had decided. The Supreme Court quashed the point of the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that granted the aunt independent visitation rights. An important prerequisite for what was decided about the father’s visitation rights was accordingly no longer relevant and also that point in the conclusion of the judgment was rescinded,
Reference: HR-2012-405-A, case no. 2012/32, civil appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
23 February 2012
Criminal law. Application of the law. Sentencing. Financial crime.
The case concerned application of the law and sentencing for aggravated fraud on a creditor in the amount of NOK 2.8 million and aggravated money laundering of proceeds derived from the offender’s own criminal acts – called « aggravated self-laundering ». The Supreme Court established that the provision relating to self-laundering in section 317 subsection 2 of the Penal Code shall only be applicable together with other penal provisions (concurrence of offences) if other aspects of the criminal offence are encompassed than what is already comprised by the primary penal provision. When the self-laundering and the primary crime consisted in the same concrete act there was no room for a conviction also for self-laundering. It was further established that the provision relating to self-laundering "in contrast to the provision relating to money laundering in section 317 subsection 1" does not apply to acts to secure the offender's interests which in time precedes the primary offence. In this case there was accordingly no basis for a conviction for self-laundering, neither in connection with the fraud on a creditor, nor the tax fraud. Sentence for the aggravated fraud on a creditor, the social security fraud and the lack of accounting system was set at imprisonment of one year and eight months. The fact that the defendant had been deprived of the right to carry on commercial activities of his own for life was also taken into consideration.
Reference: HR-2012-409-A, case no. 2011/2111), criminal appeal against judgment.
17 February 2012
The Disputes Act (2005) section 19-2
The Supreme Court quashed the appeal
Reference: HR-2012-376-F, case no. 2009/537), civil appeal against judgment.
15 February 2012
Criminal law. Sentencing. Aggravated robberies. Mobile persons convicted of crimes of gain. Four men were convicted in the Court of Appeal for having in the course of four days robbed three elderly people in their own homes, section 268 cf. section 267 of the Penal Code. Aggravated and ruthless violence was exercised. The Court of Appeal found that each of the robberies would in principle have been punished with imprisonment from 3 years and 6 months to 4 years and 3 months and meted out a total sentence of 7 years and 3 months for one and 8 years for the other of the two appellants. The Supreme Court referred to the fact that an amendment of the Penal Code in 2010, which was admittedly not aimed at robbery, but concerned an aggravation of punishment for unprovoked acts of violence, must have a bearing on the matter. Importance was also attached to the fact that the aggravated violence was exercised against helpless elderly people, that mobile crimes of gain represent major social and criminal law challenges and that the robberies were well planned and organized. The Court of Appeal's sentence was found suitable and the appeals were quashed.
Reference: HR-2012-341-A, case no. 2011/1769, criminal appeal against judgment.
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
15 February 2012
Criminal procedure. Competence
The case concerned sentencing for, amongst other things, aggravated money laundering, fraud on a creditor and conspiracy to defraud. The question was whether Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Schei was incompetent, cf. section 108 of the Courts Act because his son is working as a police lawyer with the Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime. There was no reason to assume, nor was it submitted, that the Chief Justice was biased in the matter. Nor did the Supreme Court find that, objectively speaking, there were any reasonable or pertinent grounds for doubting his impartiality when seeing the situation from the position of the accused or the general observer.
Reference: HR-2012-344-A, case no. 2011/2111), criminal appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
14 February 2012
Criminal law. Sentencing. Aggravated violence.
One evening following disagreements at a restaurant the Defendant struck the victim in the face with his fist resulting in a fractured jaw, cf. the Criminal Procedure Act section 229 1st penal alternative. The offence took place after the Amendment Act of 25 June 2010 no. 46 came into force, according to which punishment for, amongst other offences, aggravated violence was increased. The Supreme Court held that the offence was not the type of violence that fell entirely within the core area of what the aggravation of punishment was aimed at. The perpetrator and the victim knew each other well beforehand and there had in the past been a few disagreements between them. At the same time the one blow had a considerable injury potential, and the exercise of violence occurred in a public place. In the light of the clear statements about an aggravation of punishment set out in the preparatory works of the amendment, punishment was set at 5 months' imprisonment.
Reference: HR-2012-331-A, case no. 2011/1927, criminal appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
14 February 2012
Criminal law. Gross corruption and breach of trust with fraudulent intent. Sentencing. Procedure.
The case concerned procedure and sentencing related to the conviction of three men for, amongst other things, gross corruption and breach of trust with fraudulent intent in connection with a municipal real estate company, cf. sections 275, 276, 276b and 276a of the Penal Code. The principal offender had key duties in connection with the distribution and follow-up of assignments, the other two were running their own businesses which carried out commissions for the company. The principal offender received a total of around NOK 1.5 million in bribes from the two businesses and further bribes from a third. They had also cooperated in draining the company of large amounts by using fictitious invoices. In connection with an appeal against procedure the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal had not had the opportunity to review the subsumption for a matter against which an appeal had been filed, but where the Court of Appeal refused the leave to appeal. Instead of quashing the Court of Appeal's judgment, the Supreme Court based the sentencing on the District Court's subsumption. The sentence of the principal offender was set at 5 years' imprisonment. Because of a slack period of around one year, one year of the sentence had to be suspended with a period of probation of five years, cf. Article 6.1 of the ECHR. The Defendant's loss of legal rights was also to a certain extent taken into account. The sentences for the other two were set at two years' imprisonment, 6 months of which were suspended for one of them with a period of probation of three years.
Reference: HR-2012-330-A, case no. 2011/1885), criminal appeal against judgment
JUDGMENT
14 February 2012
Criminal law. Driving while intoxicated. Loss of driving licence. Regulation relating to the right to drive a motor vehicle.
The case concerned the question whether it was possible in connection with a conviction for driving while intoxicated to determine a shorter period of suspension of the licence than the minimum period of one year, cf. section 33.1 of the Road Traffic Act, if the Defendant has had the licence in his possession for a long period of time after the time of the offence, cf. section 1-4 subsection 2 of the Regulation. Because the period of suspension of not less than a year is statutory it was required to find a clear authority - a derogation authority - to allow the Regulation to make provisions where the period of suspension is reduced to less than the minimum period. The Supreme Court held that neither the text of the law nor the preparatory works contained any indications that the Regulation was intended to grant exemptions from the law. There were accordingly no grounds for going below the minimum period of one year set out in section 33.1 subsection 2 of the Road Traffic Act and the appeal was quashed. Because the Defendant had had the driving licence in his possession for over six months, the District Court's judgment was amended to the effect that a new driving test was no longer required, cf. section 8-3 subsection 5 of the Regulation.
Reference: HR-2012-333-A, case no. 2011/2046), criminal appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
14 February 2012
Labour law. Age discrimination. Collective agreement. Helicopter pilots.
The case concerned age discrimination, cf. section 13-1 cf. section 13-3, and raised the question whether the employer based on the collective agreement is entitled to demand that helicopter pilots resign upon attaining the age of 60 years. The Supreme Court referred to the fact that the rules of the Working Environment Act must be interpreted to be compatible with EU Directive 2000/78/EF relating to equal rights in working life and the European Court of Justice’s case law. In the decision C-447/09 (Prigge) the EU Court held that a special age limit for pilots could not be justified by safety considerations or health given that the certificate rules allow flying until the pilot attains the age of 65. Also in Norway the certificate rules provide that commercial flying is allowed until the pilot is 65 subject to certain specific conditions. The Supreme Court held that it then followed directly from the Prigge judgment that safety considerations or health aspects cannot justify the 60-year limit for the helicopter pilots. The pilots’ claim for continued employment was allowed and they were awarded costs before all courts.
Reference: HR-2012-325-A, case no. 2010/127, civil appeal against judgment
JUDGMENT
14 February 2012
Insurance law. Motor vehicle liability
On getting out of a tank lorry the driver lost his footing and fell approximately 1.5 meters contracting a permanent injury to his shoulder. The issue of the matter was whether this was an injury that was comprised by liability under section 4 of the Motor Vehicle Liability Act, cf. its wording: “If a motor vehicle causes damage …”. The Supreme Court evaluated the preparatory works of the Act and case law and referred to the fact that the condition “causes” contains a causal requirement. In this case the dominant causal factor was the design and height of the tank lorry. There was no basis for blaming the driver’s behaviour. The Supreme Court held that the injury was comprised by the liability and quashed the insurance company’s appeal.
Reference: HR-2012-326-A, case no. 2011/1641, civil appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
9 February 2012
Damages. Remedy for non-economic loss after grossly negligent rape. General level of damages. Litigation costs. section 3-5 of the Compensatory Damages Act.
A man was convicted of having had sexual intercourse with the victim while she was asleep due to intoxication and fatigue, cf. section 192 subsection 1 b, cf. subsection 4,of the Penal Code. He had also taken pictures during the intercourse and distributed these to friends. The Supreme Court found that the standard for remedy for non-economic loss after grossly negligent rape, which in 2006 was set at NOK 60 000, should now be adjusted upwards to NOK 90 000, in parallel with the adjustment in 2011 of the standard damages for intentional rape to NOK 150 000. The photographs represented a considerable additional burden for the victim, and the Court of Appeal's determination of damages in the amount of NOK 100 000 was found suitable. As regards costs, the Supreme Court majority held that neither the Defendant nor the victim could demand that the other party be ordered to refund the State's costs, cf. section 100, cf. section 435,of the Criminal Procedure Act and Supreme Court judgment HR-2012-32-A . (Dissenting vote 4-1)
Reference: HR-2012-293-A, case no. 2011/1693), civil appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
9 February 2012
Criminal law. Application of the law. Aggravated robbery resulting in death. Guilt requirement.
The case concerned the Court of Appeal's application of the law when convicting the defendant of aggravated robbery resulting in death, and the issue was whether the guilt requirement as regards the resulting death, cf. section 43 of the Penal Code, had been applied correctly. The defendant was sentenced in the Court of Appeal to 5 years' imprisonment for aggravated robbery together with two others of an elderly woman in her flat, cf. section 268, cf. section 267, of the Penal Code. Another defendant had tied up the woman, placed her on her stomach on the bed and covered her with eiderdowns and pillows before they left her. She died from a combination of pain, stress reaction, the position she had been placed in, and that her respiratory passages had been blocked under the bed clothes. After a review of the records of the presiding Court of Appeal Judge's summation to the jury, the Supreme Court held that no error had been committed for the defendant's possibility of realizing the risk of resulting death, and the appeal was quashed.
Reference: HR-2012-292-A case no. 2011/1518, criminal appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
1 February 2012
Law of torts and contract. Employer’s liability. Bullying in primary school. Standard of due care.
The case concerned a claim for compensation against a local authority for damage as a result of bullying in primary school during the years 1987 to 1993. Before the Supreme Court the question was whether the Court of Appeal had applied the correct standard of due care. The pupil was over several years isolated, teased and the object of verbal “mudslinging” without having the possibility of answering back. There was no doubt that the tormenting was of a nature, a frequency and a duration that must be characterized as bullying. The Supreme Court held that the follow-up from the school was inadequate. The gist of the means the school used was to improve the pupil’s social maturity. The school was guilty of negligence in having failed at an earlier point to seek a clarification of the situation and to take action against the bullies. Based on an overall evaluation the Supreme Court held that the requirements which it was reasonable to expect the school to meet had been set aside and there were grounds for awarding compensation pursuant to section 2-1 of the Compensatory Damages Act.
Reference: HR-2012-241-A, case no. 2011/1163, civil appeal against judgment.
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
24 January 2012
Civil Procedure. Competence
Question of competence of a Supreme Court Justice in a case relating to invalidity and revision of loan-financed purchase of composite savings products. The justice had earlier held an office on the control committee in another finance group than the one that was a party to the case. The Supreme Court held that there were special circumstances suggesting that the justice was incompetent, cf. section 108 of the Courts of Justice Act. Importance was in particular attached to the fact that an objection to his competence had been raised by one of the litigant parties and that one of the appellants had brought an action concerning a similar investment product against the finance group in which the justice had held an office.
Reference: HR-2012-203-A, case no. 2011/1053), civil appeal against judgment.
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
24 January 2012
Criminal Procedure Act, Section 54
The Supreme Court quashed the appeal.
Reference: HR-2012-180-F, case no. 2012/4, criminal appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
24 January 2012
Criminal law. Sentencing. Preventive custody. Attempted murder.
The case concerned determination of penalty or sanction for attempted murder under particularly aggravating circumstances. The victim had suffered a series of knife wounds to the neck region. Because of doubt whether the requirement contained in section 39c of the Criminal Procedure Act as regards imminent risk of such new crimes as addressed in the provision was met, preventive custody was not used. In the sentencing importance was attached to the fact that the victim of the attempted murder was a young sleeping boy, that it was unprovoked and carried out in an extremely painful manner and that the victim suffered serious and permanent physical injuries and major mental after-effects. The Defendant's confession only carried limited weight. Sentence was set at 7 years and 6 months' imprisonment.
Reference: HR-2012-185-A, case no. 2011/1726, criminal appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
23 January 2012
Contract law. Surety’s liability. Guarantee agreement.
The case concerned interpretation of a suretyship of NOK 2 million that was provided as security for claims exceeding NOK 5 million in an ongoing supplier relationship. The Supreme Court majority held that it was the size of the debt at the time of default, and not at the time of the statutory demand for payment, that was decisive for the question whether the agreed threshold for when surety’s liability could be invoked was met. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s judgment that the guarantor was liable.
Reference: HR-2012-167-A, case no. 2011/1383), civil appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
23 January 2012
Criminal law. Application of the law. Environmental law. Landscape conservation.
The case concerned the application of the law in a criminal case concerning violation of section 5 of the Nature Conservation Act and section 93 i of the Planning and Building Act. A road cooperative had done some work on an old trail in a preserved landscape area without the necessary permission. The Supreme Court majority emphasized that the question whether a violation had been committed must be decided on the basis of an evaluation of how the natural and cultural landscape emerged before and after the work in question respectively, including what it would look like after some time had elapsed, taking into consideration foreseeable use of the road. The acquittal was not based on any such evaluation. The Court of Appeal’s judgment with main hearing was quashed.
Reference: HR-2012-168-A, case no. 2011/1677, criminal appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
23 January 2012
Contract law. Surety’s liability. Guarantee agreement.
The case concerned interpretation of a suretyship of NOK 2 million that was provided as security for claims exceeding NOK 5 million in an ongoing supplier relationship. The Supreme Court majority held that it was the size of the debt at the time of default, and not at the time of the statutory demand for payment, that was decisive for the question whether the agreed threshold for when surety’s liability could be invoked was met. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s judgment that the guarantor was liable.
Reference: HR-2012-167-A, case no. 2011/1383), civil appeal against judgment.
DECISION
19 January 2012
Civil procedure. Impartiality. Section 108 of the Courts Act.
The case concerned the selection of judges for a plenary session as a Grand Chamber by drawing lots. According to section 1 subsection 1, 3rd and 4th sentences, of the Rules of Procedure for the Supreme Court in session as a Grand Chamber, judges who are not impartial or who “on due grounds request to be recused from handling the case” shall not be included in the drawing of lots. The decision under the 3rd and 4th sentence shall be made by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Justices Matningsdal, Øie, Webster and Kallerud shall be excluded from the selection of judges for the case to be tried by a Grand Chamber against the State represented by the Commission for the Reopening of Criminal Cases.
Reference: HR-2012-155-J, case no. 2011/1820), civil appeal against judgment
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
18 January 2012
Civil procedure. Appeal proceedings stayed. Section 16-18 subsection 2 of the Disputes Act.
The appeal proceedings in the Supreme Court in case no. 2011/1938 stayed until a final decision is made in case no. 2011/1053.
Reference: HR-2012-142-F, case no. 2011/1938, civil appeal against judgment.
JUDGMENT
13 January 2012
The Land Concession Act, sections 1, 2, 9. The Public Administration Act, section 25.
ECHR Protocol 1 article 1.
The case concerned the validity of a decision by the County Agricultural Committee to deny concession for the acquisition of two pieces of forestland.
Reference: HR-2012-108-A, case no. 2011/1153, civil appeal against judgment.
Reference: HR-2012-167-A, case no. 2011/1383), civil appeal against judgment.
4 January 2012
Law of torts. Basis for liability. Actual bodily harm. Self-defence.
The case concerned a claim for compensation for actual bodily harm where the wrongdoer was acquitted on the grounds of self-defence because under criminal law it must be taken for a basis that in his perception he was the victim of an attack by the injured party. The Supreme Court held that mistake must be adjudged differently under criminal law and under the law of torts. While it was reasonable to exempt him from punishment on the basis of the perpetrator's perception of danger, there was, generally speaking, not much reason to deny the injured party compensation on those grounds. The exemption rule in section 1-4 2nd sentence of the Compensation Act was only applicable if the act of self-defence was aimed at a person or an object which in actual fact caused the danger. Cases where the wrongdoer incorrectly believed that he was in danger must be adjudged according to the main rule in the first sentence with the consequence that the wrongdoer was required to indemnify the damage caused by his act of self-defence. The Court of Appeal's acquittal was quashed in respect of the decision of the claim for compensation and damages for non-economic loss.
Reference: HR-2012-32-A, case no. 1/1408, civil appeal against judgment.
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
6 January 2012
Section 19-2 of the Disputes Act (2005)
The Supreme Court quashed the appeal.
Reference: HR-2012-61-F, case no. 2012/20, civil appeal against interlocutory order
The page was updated: 21.03.2012, kl. 09:43