The property tax case in Oslo

Supreme Court judgment and order 25 June 2019, HR-2019-1198-A (case no. 18-193373SIV-HRET and case no. 19-002038SIV-HRET), civil case, appeal against judgment.
I.
Oslo municipality (The Office of the Municipal Attorney in Oslo represented by Trine Riiber), Counsel Bodil Høstmælingen, KS (third-party intervener) (Counsel Frode Lauareid) v. John Sverre Svendsen (group representative) (Counsel Bettina Banoun)

II.
John Sverre Svendsen (group representative) (Counsel Bettina Banoun) v. Oslo municipality (The Office of the Municipal Attorney in Oslo represented by Trine Riiber), Counsel Bodil Høstmælingen

Justices: Webster, Bergsjø, Arntzen, Falch, Bergh

In 2015, Oslo municipality adopted Regulations on property tax for 2016. The municipality used the tax levy option in section 3 g of the Property Tax Act, and stipulated a basic allowance of NOK 4 million for all independent residential units on non-commercial property. This implied that almost 80 % of all residential units in the municipality were exempt from property tax. In the group action contesting the validity of the Regulations and the property tax notifications, the Supreme Court unanimously concluded that the Regulations' provision on basic allowance was valid, as the general characteristics of the tax were adequately maintained. The Court argued that the tax affects a high number of taxpayers that are spread over all parts of the city. However, the law sets a limit for the basic allowance, and the municipality had been close to this limit. The fact that the basic allowance was stipulated for the individual residential unit and not for each property was not contrary to the law. The Supreme Court's majority of three justices found however that the decision to levy tax was invalid because the deadline in section 14 of the Property Tax Act had been exceeded. The property tax notifications were issued in June 2016. Section 14 subsection 2 third sentence was not applicable, as the municipality had levied property tax earlier. The fact that the practice ceased in 1998 was not decisive. To obtain postponement until after 1 March, see section 14 subsection 2 first sentence, the municipality would have had to make a realistic plan giving the municipality time to levy tax within 1 March 2016. No such plan had been made. The case was dismissed for group members that had not filed a complaint before joining the group action. Dissenting votes 3-2.