Limitation of claim against a law firm and partner in charge

Justices: Indreberg, Møse, Bergsjø, Thyness, Steinsvik

A psychologist who had a received a claim from the State for repayment of refunds, entered into an agreement with Helfo on repayment and the possibility of set-off against future refunds. After it had been finally decided that the claim for repayment was time-barred, but still eligible for set-off under section 26 (a) of the Limitations Act, he submitted a claim for damages and repayment of fees against the law firm that had advised him in connection with the signing of the agreement. The Supreme Court found that the claims originated from the original contract of engagement with the law firm. The claims then emerged from a contract, see section 9 (3) of the Limitations Act, so the starting point for the period of limitation was regulated by section 3 of the Limitations Act. It was also assumed that he had been able to claim performance when the State used a time-barred claim in a set-off for the first time. The three-year deadline under section 3 subsection 1 of the Limitations Act had expired when conciliation proceedings were instituted in the case. The Supreme Court also found that the extension period under section 10 (1) of the Limitation Act started to run upon the receipt of the response in the case against the State. This deadline, too, had expired when the conciliation proceedings started. The claims were thus time-barred. Judgment was given in favour of the law firm.