Conviction for homicide and aggravated robbery: Inspection and the speciliaty principle in the Extradition Convention 1957

Justices: Indreberg, Matheson, Normann, Ringnes, Falch

A convicted person had been extradicted from Bulgaria to Norway because of a homicide charge. Later, he was also charged with aggravated robbery committed in connection with the homicide, and he was convicted for both offences. While he was is custody, a concealed investigation was initiated against him for conspiracy to homicide and threats. The Supreme Court found that the convicted person did not have a right to inspect the documents related to the new case, see section 264 subsection 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act, as it concerned procedurally different cases. Nor did section 264 subsection 8 give the convicted person a right of inspection, as it could not be presumed that the information in the new case was significant to the question of guilt or punishment. The prosecution authority's withholding of information that one of the witnesses had reported threats made against him, was after an individual assessment not considered a procedural error. The Supreme Court further stated that the robbery conviction was a violation of the speciality principle in the Extradition Convention, providing that a person cannot be indicted for and convicted of a previous offence that was not part of the basis for extradition. Bulgarian authorities had, however, given a subsequent consent to extradition, also for robbery. The Supreme Court found that this remedied the error. References were made to case law from the Court of Justice of the European Union and similar rules under the European Arrest Warrant system. The error had not affected the judgment to the convicted person's detriment, and could not lead to a setting aside of the robbery conviction. The convicted person's appeal against the procedure was dismissed.