Restraining order with electronic monitoring upheld by the Supreme Court

Justices: Indreberg, Matheson, Kallerud, Falch, Thyness

A defendant had previously been convicted of human trafficking for having exploiting the aggrieved person for prostitution. He had also been ordered not to contact the aggrieved person for five years, see section 57 subsection 2 (b) of the Penal Code. In a new case, he was sentenced in the Court of Appeal to 90 days of imprisonment for violations of sections 266 and 268 of the Penal Code. The Supreme Court found that the application of restraining orders was not limited to cases involving violence or threats. The special rules on a person's own home in section 57 subsection 3 was not limited to cases where the home was shared by the aggrieved person and the defendant. It was also not decisive whether there was a specific restraining order that forced the defendant to leave his home, or whether it was a consequence of the determination of the prohibition zone. Electronic monitoring was necessary to protect the aggrieved person, and would not constitute a disproportionate measure towards the defendant. There was also a likely risk of criminal acts towards the aggrieved person. The majority of four justices found that the prohibition zone during the first year after the Supreme Court's judgment should also include the defendant's home, and then a smaller zone during the following year. The minority considered it a disproportionate measure to determine the prohibition zone with the consequence that the defendant had to move, and found that the smaller zone should also apply during the first year. As a consequence of the monitoring, the part of the sentence that had not been served in custody on remand, was suspended.

Read the whole judgment (Norwegian only)