Whether the criminal effect of tax amnesty covers other offences than tax fraud

Justices: Falkanger, Normann, Bergsjø, Arntzen, Thyness

A person had been convicted of contribution of aggravated tax fraud, see section 379, cf. section 378, cf. section 15, of the Penal Code, accounting violations, see section 393, cf. section 392, of the Penal Code, cf. section 15, cf. section 10, of the Accounting Act, cf. section 15 of the Penal Code, and preparation of incorrect documents that may serve as evidence to obtain advantages related to taxation or duties, see section 365, cf. section 15, of the Penal Code. He had voluntarily submitted corrected VAT statements and thus met the conditions for tax amnesty. Against that background, he received a deferred sentence for the tax fraud. The question for the Supreme Court to consider was whether the tax amnesty would have a similar effect for other offences. With a 3-2 vote, the Supreme Court found that the tax amnesty could only have effect for the tax fraud, and that the close connection between the various offences could not be decisive. The majority attributed particular weight to the proximity between tax amnesty and surtax, to considerations of legal policy and to the fact that the various penal provisions protect various interests. The minority's view was mainly rooted in the consideration of the taxpayer's legitimate expectations and the effectiveness of the tax amnesty. The appeal against the Court of Appeal's judgment, which had given a deferred sentence for the tax fraud and a penalty for the other offences of 30 days of imprisonment, was dismissed.  

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