Imposition of reverse violence alarm was unconstitutional
Supreme Court order 27 September 2024, HR-2024-1737-A, (case no. 24-102963STR-HRET), criminal case, appeal against Eidsivating Court of Appeal's order 24 June 2024.
I. The Public Prosecution Authority (Counsel Mads Fredrik Baardseth) v. A (Counsel Mathias Vellesen)
II. B (Counsel Therese Lohne Boehlke) v. A (Counsel Mathias Vellesen)
In April 2024, the Public Prosecution Authority was given a legal basis to impose a reverse violence alarm (electronic monitoring) on people suspected of having violated a restraining order. Later that month, a woman was imposed such monitoring based on suspicion of violations of a restraining order committed before the relevant statutory provision entered into force.
The Supreme Court found that this was contrary to Article 97 of the Constitution, which protects citizens against laws being given retroactive effect.
The Supreme Court pointed out that the reverse violence alarm is a coercive measure that interferes with the freedom of individuals, where the impact of the Constitution is significant. The interference means that the person is banned from one or more geographical areas, in this case an area of almost 200 square kilometres, including most of Oslo city centre.
The previous violations of the restraining order were a necessary condition with great significance for the imposition of a reverse violence alarm. When the previous violations were committed, the woman could not foresee that her actions could lead to a reverse violence alarm. The Supreme Court therefore found that retroactivity could only be justified by strong societal considerations.
Although the reverse violence alarm provision was introduced based on strong societal considerations, this could not justify giving the provision retroactive effect. The strong societal considerations must be linked to the need for retroactivity, and not to the general reasoning for the provision.
The consequence of not taking into account violations of a restraining order committed before the amendment entered into force was that it would take slightly longer for the provision to become fully effective. However, this could not be decisive when the amendment significantly expands the possibility to impose intrusive coercive measures.
The Supreme Court also stated that the person to be protected did not have the right to appeal against the court’s decision not to impose a reverse violence alarm.
The judgment clarifies that electronic monitoring (reverse violence alarm) cannot be imposed based on suspicion of violations of a restraining order committed before the relevant statutory provision entered into force.
Read the order from the Supreme Court (PDF)
Areas of law: Article 97 of the Constitution, coercive measures in criminal procedure, section 222 g of the Criminal Procedure Act
Key paragraphs: 67, 74-78, 81, 94
Justices: Ringnes, Falch, Høgetveit Berg, Steinsvik, Lund