A high threshold for applying the contractual good-faith standard

Supreme Court judgment of 17 November 2026, HR-2026-2465-A (case no. 26-005409SIV-HRET), civil case, appeal against Gulating Court of Appeal's judgment of 20 November 2025.

A (Advocate Terje Dahl Svendsen) v. Lyse Marked AS (Advocate Stig Berge)

The case concerned the settlement following the termination of an agreement between commercial parties for financial power management. It raised, in particular, questions regarding the application of the good-faith standard in contractual interpretation.

Under the good-faith standard, where one party has a particular understanding of the content of an agreement that differs from its objective interpretation, and the other party was aware of that understanding, the former understanding may prevail.

The Supreme Court stated that the good-faith standard involves a normative assessment and that it is not sufficient that a party ought to have understood what the other party meant. The requirement is that, at the time the contract was concluded, the party had to have understood it. The rule therefore constitutes a narrow exception to the objective principle of interpretation. The threshold for applying this standard in commercial contexts is high.

It must first be established whether the contracting party can be criticised in such a way that considerations of loyalty dictate that the party should be bound. This is an individual assessment where weight must be attached to the clarity of the wording, whether the agreement was individually negotiated, its complexity, the area of life or business it was intended to regulate, and whether the parties were on an equal footing, particularly in terms of expertise.

Where terms have been imposed unilaterally and the party invoking the good-faith standard has greater expertise than the other party, there is a high threshold for departing from the objective interpretation on that basis.

The specific issue in the case was whether one party had to have understood that the wording of the agreement contained an error and, consequently, was bound by the interpretation relied on by the other party. The Supreme Court answered that question in the negative.

Area of law: Contract law; contractual interpretation

Key paragraphs: 31–33

Justices: Falkanger, Høgetveit Berg, Steinsvik, Steen and Wennerås.